The Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949: between Myth and Reality

1. Despite decades of revisionist scholarship on the early Cold War, the findings never penetrated into the mainstream of American culture:

"...the constraints of commercial publishing, book reviewing, and textbook-writing, and the unwillingness of the mass media to incorporate dissenting perspectives has limited their access to audiences outside the colleges and the universities" (Eisenberg, pp.174-175)

Questions:

a. What is the meaning of "revisionist scholarship"? In the particular field of Cold War Research?

b. Are scholars condemned to stay out of commercial publishing?

c. Does not Carolyn Eisenberg's formulation imply a kind of "conspiracy theory"? Is there anybody setting the rules in the mass media?

d. What is the view of the West's behaviour during the Cold War outside of the Western world?

A more satisfactory formulation:

u[Despite decades of scientific debate on the early Cold War, the debates never penetrated into the mainstream of Western culture. ]u

In the traditionalist narratives of the early Cold War, the East-West confrontation in Berlin appears to be the defining moment

"Yet the official account had always been inaccurate, as neatly demonstrated by US military historian William Stivers in a little-noticed article appearing in Diplomatic History" (Carolyn Eisenberg, p.176)


Questions:

a. Is there anything like "official history"" in a democratic country?

b. Can you give examples of the political use of the Berlin blockade in the West's collective memory of the Cold War?

c. Can you defy the traditional Western view about the Berlin blockade without putting into question simultaneously the "Soviet" and Eastern European view?

u[b[Proposition ]u
In the history of the early Cold War, the East-West confrontation in Berlin has been the defining moment but not in the way the protagonists perceived it at the time]b.

Thesis n°1: The Berlin crisis was never about the freedom of the city but about the Western decision to create a separate West German government in separation of Yalta and Potsdam

""Central to American and British thinking was the desire to incorporate the west german zones into the Marshall Plan and to deny the Soviets any voice in West European recovery" (Eisenberg, p.177)

a. March 1948 as a turning point (instructions to the USMG Lucius Clay; Six Power London Conference)?

b. How did the Soviets behave in April/May 1948? (talks about a unified currency reform)

c. Which step is taken in June 1948 by Military Governor Lucius Clay?

New formulation: The Berlin crisis was a consequence of the American decision to create a separate German State after the Western powers had experienced that "democracy", "free elections", "currency" had not the same meaning when being used by the Soviet side. In the first semester of 1948, the Spirit of Yalta and Potsdam was dead.

Thesis n°2: The American and British determination to push ahead with partition precluded a diplomatic solution and seriously undermined the United Nations

"By mid-September, the four powers had reached an impasse. The British and the french preferred to continue negotiations, whereas the Americans wished to break them off. US officials had found the Moscow talks to be very dangerous, as their allies, and even their own ambassador, seemed to constantly gravitate towards compromise. (...) To the Americans, the success of the airlift obviated the need for further diplomacy" (Eisenberg, p.182-83)

a. "Cold War" means the willingness to negotiate, while restraining the use of force (meetings in Moscow; Soviet willingness to further supplying the western zones with food; personal emissary sent to Stalin by Truman)

b. Why did the State department turn to the United Nations in October 1948?

c. Elections in Berlin

Better formulation: The Americans were divided about the best way to react to the Soviet partial blockade. What determined their final decision to go ahead with confrontation was their wish to assert their authority in Western Europe.

Thesis n°3: This antipathy to compromise created a necessity for overwhelming military power and a usable nuclear arsenal

"To reduce the likehood that the Soviet would menace the airlift, the National Security Council decided to dispatch B-29 bombers to Europe. It was this type of plane that had carried out th attack on Hiroshima. Since it was widely assumed that the B-29s were nuclear-capable, US policy-makers hoped they would provide sufficient deterrence to the Russians". (Eisenberg, p.190)

a. What was Truman's view about a nuclear bombing of the Soviet Union?

b. Were the US able to carry out an nuclear attack in the summer of 1948?

c. Why was the Soviet Union so scared by a(n impossible) nuclear attack?


u[Proposed formulation: Since the Americans felt unable to win a successful war with conventional troops and weapons there was a strong debate inside the Truman administration about wether to use the nuclear bomb. It could only strengthen the readiness to confrontation with the Soviet Union]u.